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Abstract 
 
Competition reduces rent extraction in private-sector firms. In this article, we empirically 
assess whether it similarly disciplines politicians by evaluating local-level governments’ 
performance in Flanders. The results indicate that electoral competition – measured via the 
number of parties competing in elections – significantly positively affects the productive 
efficiency of municipal policy. Intertemporal competition – measured as the volatility of election 
outcomes over time – has a similar, but weaker, positive effect. These beneficial effects are 
mitigated by the fact that competition may lead to more fragmented governments, which is 
shown to work against their productive efficiency. Overall, though, the beneficial effects 
outweigh the unfavourable ones in our sample. 
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Introduction 
Economists generally agree that competition in the private sector improves consumer welfare: 
i.e., prices are lower and quantities higher under (perfect) competition compared to a 
monopoly situation, leading to a dissipation of monopoly rents and a larger consumer surplus. 
Some scholars – in both economics and political science – likewise maintain that lack of 
competition induces rent extraction by politicians or, reversely, that “competition for political 
office reduces the potential for opportunism by politicians” (Wittman, 1989: 1396; see also 
Stigler, 1972; Becker, 1983; Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993; Pinto and Timmons, 2005). The 
intuition is that a lack of political competitors moderates the extent to which politicians are 
held accountable for their actions at election time – thus allowing them to serve narrow 
economic (or selfish) interests without jeopardizing their re-election odds.  
 
Empirical evaluations of this proposition have remained surprisingly scant (for exceptions, see 
Svensson, 1998; Besley et al., 2008; Padovano and Ricciuti, 2009; De Paola and Scoppa, 2011). 
Moreover, most existing analyses provide only indirect evidence as higher rent extraction under 
non-competitive environments is inferred from variations in economic outcomes, rather than 
measured directly (more details below).1 In contrast, this article aims to provide a more direct 
test by assessing (local) governments’ productive efficiency. High (low) productive efficiency 
indicates that the government generates high (low) levels of public goods with limited (high) 
spending (Koopmans, 1951). As such, it reveals how (in)effectively the incumbent translates 
public spending into public goods – or, reversely, to what extent (s)he engages in rent 
extraction. While a very large literature has developed investigating the measurement and 
determinants of local government efficiency (e.g., Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Borge et al., 2008; 
                                                 
1  In an interesting alternative approach, Norris (1996) and Becker et al. (2009) show that MPs facing a 
low degree of electoral competition have significantly more extra-parliamentary positions and 
earnings, respectively. Geys (2013) furthermore suggests that politicians in competitive districts adjust 
their extra-parliamentary positions more extensively prior to elections. While these findings suggests a 
different time-use of such politicians, it need not necessarily reflect rent extraction. 
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Kalb et al., 2012; for reviews, see De Borger and Kerstens, 2000; Kalb, 2010), existing studies in 
this field fail, to the best of our knowledge, to take into account the potential importance of 
political competition. Our study provides a first step towards bridging this gap. 
 
To capture the potential influence of different aspects of competition in the political arena in 
our analysis, we rely on two measures of competition: i.e. the number of parties competing in 
elections (i.e. electoral competition) and the volatility of election outcomes over time (i.e. 
intertemporal competition). While we defend the use of these measures in more detail below, the 
former reflects the level of competition at a certain point in time, whereas the latter intends to 
capture the degree of competition over a certain period of time.2 Overall, the results – using data 
from 308 Flemish municipal governments in the year 2000 – corroborate that competition is 
associated with lower productive inefficiency. More specifically, electoral competition (i.e., the 
number of parties competing in the election) significantly positively affects the productive 
efficiency of municipal policy, whereas intertemporal competition (i.e., the volatility of election 
outcomes over time) has a similarly positive, but weaker, effect. While these effects are 
mitigated by the fact that competition may lead to more fragmented governments (which is 
shown to work against local governments’ productive efficiency), the overall effect of 
competition remains positive in our sample.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 briefly discusses the foregoing 
literature. Section 2 gives background information on the Flemish local institutional setting and 
                                                 
2 As our focus lies on political competition within rather than between municipalities on governments’ 
productive efficiency, we do not explicitly take into account the potential impacts of yardstick or tax 
competition. Both forms of competition may, however, involve politicians trying to discipline themselves 
– either to gain re-election or to attract a mobile tax base – and thus might reduce productive 
inefficiencies. Supportive evidence for such a view has been presented in, for instance, see Geys (2006) 
and Revelli and Tovmo (2007).  
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describes our indices of competition in the political arena. The results of the empirical analysis 
are in section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Literature overview 
The policy consequences of competition in the political arena (henceforth also referred to as 
‘political competition’) have been extensively discussed by both political scientists and (public) 
economists. Two main focal points can thereby be identified. First, several authors analyse the 
effects of political competition on the size of government and the type of policies pursued. This 
literature can be traced back to, at least, Key (1949), while more recent evidence is provided in, 
for instance, Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993), Ferris et al. (2008) and Aidt and Eterovic (2011). 
Second, substantial attention is awarded to the impact of competition on the productive and 
allocative efficiency of public goods provision. As the focus of the current article lies on 
governments’ productive efficiency, the remainder of this section will restrict itself to studies 
focussing on productive (in)efficiency and the associated rent extraction.  
 
Studies analysing the link between political competition and government productive efficiency 
generally argue that more stringent competition between parties (or politicians) is likely to lead 
to a reduction in rent extraction – much like economic competition in the private market 
reduces monopoly rents. Reversely, when competition in the political arena is low “the state 
will exercise its monopoly power, provide fewer public services, and earn greater rents” (Lake 
and Baum, 2001: 590). The reason is that competition for political office reduces the ability of 
politicians to engage in opportunistic behaviour. Such actions, in a competitive environment, 
could cost them reelection – whereas this is unlikely when there is a lack of (significant) 
competition. “Simply put, in the absence of competition, accountability suffers” (Holbrook and 
Van Dunk, 1993: 960) and incumbents can extract (higher) rents without jeopardizing their re-
election odds. 
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Formal (economic) analyses of this relation likewise support the proposition that “candidates’ 
competition for office might induce a dissipation of political rents” (Polo, 1998: 3; see also 
Svensson, 1998; Besley et al., 2010). A lack of competition in the political arena is thereby 
modelled as a bias in the number of committed voters in favour of one party (Polo, 1998; Besley 
et al., 2010) or the absence of a pool of non-committed voters that could ‘swing’ the election 
outcome (Svensson, 1998). Still, Lizzeri and Persico (2005) show that defining competition 
through the number of parties in the system might lead to increases in the accommodation of 
special interest groups (and thus less efficient policies). This mirrors Polo (1998), who finds that 
rent extraction first decreases with the number of parties, but may then increase again. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, empirical evaluations of the relation between political 
competition and governments’ rent extraction are scant. Moreover, the evidence presented in 
the foregoing literature (e.g., Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Svensson, 1998; Pinto and 
Timmons, 2005; Padovano and Ricciuti, 2009; Besley et al., 2010; De Paola and Scoppa, 2011) is 
based on a wide variety of political competition measures, and remains indirect since higher 
levels of rent extraction under non-competitive environments are inferred from variations in 
economic outcomes (such as economic growth rates) rather than analyses of actual policies. This 
approach, however, fails to explicitly test for incumbents’ potential productive inefficiency or 
rent extraction. 
 
Overall, it is clear from the above discussion that various approaches have been introduced to 
measure political competition, without reaching any consensus as to what constitutes the most 
appropriate measure. Particularly, both theoretically and empirically, scholars have relied on 
the number of parties competing in elections (e.g., Polo, 1998; Lizzeri and Persico, 2005), the 
vote share distribution in elections (e.g., Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993; Vanhanen, 2000), the 
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seat division in parliament or government (e.g., Ferris et al., 2008), the time a given party (or 
political bloc) has been in power (e.g., Skilling and Zeckhauser, 2002) and so forth. Even though 
this variety suggests that the concept of political competition has multiple dimensions that are 
hard to adequately capture in one single indicator, most scholars assess only one measure in 
their analysis. Below, we instead include two measures intended to capture different 
dimensions of political competition. Moreover, by focusing on economic outcomes, previous 
scholarship could not directly address rent extraction. The present paper takes a first step at 
bridging this gap by assessing the relation between competition in the political arena and 
productive inefficiency in the provision of public goods in Flemish municipalities. 
 
2. Institutional setting and measurement of competition 
2.1. Local government in Flanders 
Municipal governments are the lowest level of government in Flanders (and Belgium) next to 
the federal, regional and provincial levels. Nonetheless, they have considerable autonomy to 
pursue their own policies and assume significant responsibilities in education, local 
infrastructure, public safety, social welfare, … The political system in the Flemish 
municipalities can be characterized as a parliamentary system where the executive board is 
formed by a political majority. That is, local governments consist of the College of Mayor and 
Alderman (the executive body) and the local council (the legislative body). Councillors are 
chosen via municipal elections that take place once every six years (there are no term limits). 
Following the election, the party or coalition of parties that controls a majority of the seats in 
the council decides on the composition of the executive board (unlike in, for example, Norway, 
where the College reflects seats in the council; cf. Tovmo, 2007).  
 
Several characteristics of the Flemish local institutional setting create a relatively low barrier to 
entry for aspiring politicians, which, in turn, allows for high levels of competition in the 
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political arena. Firstly, municipal inhabitants above age 18 can stand for election on the local 
council (subject to certain eligibility requirements, such as the absence of criminal convictions) 
and presenting a list in the municipal elections is easy (the proposed list should be presented 
four weeks prior to the elections accompanied by 5 to 100 signatures – depending on the size of 
the municipality – of individuals eligible to vote in the municipality). Secondly, elections take 
place using a system of Proportional Representation (i.e., highest average Imperiali – without 
legal thresholds). In such systems, even small parties can gain representation. Given that voters 
do not want to ‘waste’ their votes on parties that are unlikely to obtain a seat and party elites 
refrain from wasting resources on hopeless election campaigns (Duverger, 1954/1972) this low 
threshold of representation has a positive effect on parties’ willingness to enter the political 
arena (Fiva and Folke, 2012). 
 
2.2. Measuring political competition 
Building on insights from the foregoing literature (see above), we rely on two measures of 
political competition that intend to capture two distinct aspects of this concept. The first, and 
most straightforward, measure is the number of parties that enter the electoral ‘battle’ (e.g., 
Polo, 1998; Lizzeri and Persico, 2005). The idea here is that with a larger number of parties 
contesting the election (ELPAR), political parties have to work harder to convince voters. This 
reflects the extent of competition at a certain point in time. Clearly, this simple measure ignores 
that competition is arguably higher when two parties of equal strength compete compared to 
the situation where one party has a significant lead over multiple others. This can in principle 
be addressed by applying weights to each party depending on its ex ante expected political 
strength (as obtained from, for instance, opinion polls). These are, however, not available in the 
Flemish municipal setting. Technically, one might use the post-election vote or seat division as 
an approximation. However, such post-election outcomes are less appropriate because they not 
only indicate the level of competition in the party system, but also capture possible gridlock 
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effects in policy-making (e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Ashworth et al., 2005). To avoid these 
difficulties, we rely on the absolute number of parties competing in the main analysis (though 
robustness checks indicate qualitatively similar results when weighting parties with their vote 
or seat share; details upon request). On average, just over 5 parties compete in Flemish 
municipal elections – ranging from a minimum of 2 parties to a maximum of 13 parties (see 
Table A1 for summary statistics). 
 
Our second measure of competition explicitly takes into account that at least part of the 
electorate is not fully committed to ‘their’ party, and that the struggle over this pool of floating 
voters induces competition between the parties (Svensson, 1998). Although we lack 
information on the number of non-committed voters, we can use historical information on 
changes in parties’ ‘market shares’ as a proxy. This change in the electoral fortunes of parties 
over time reflects the intertemporal degree of competition, and can be captured using a measure 
of political volatility (Pedersen, 1979):    
n
i tititt
ppVOLATILITY
1 1,,,1
.
2
1  where pi,t is the vote 
(or seat) share of party i in the election at time t and n refers to the number of parties. The index 
takes a value 0 if the vote (or seat) share of each party remains unchanged between two 
elections. The maximum value of 1 is reached when the full set of parties in the election at t-1 is 
replaced by a non-overlapping alternative set of ‘new’ parties. As such, higher values of the 
index indicate higher volatility in vote (or seat) shares – and therefore point to fiercer 
competition. We calculate this measure of VOLATILITY over four electoral cycles since the 
amalgamation of Flemish municipalities  in 1976 (i.e., 1976-1982, 1982-1988, 1988-1994 and 
1994-2000) using data for each of the seven ‘parties’ in Flanders (i.e., GROEN!, SP.a, CD&V, 
VU, VLD, Vlaams Belang and the miscellaneous group of ‘others’, which combines all local 
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parties) in all 308 Flemish municipalities.3 Then, we take the unweighted average over these 
four electoral periods as our measure of intertemporal competitiveness of a municipality: 
POLVOL =   
4
1 ,1
.
4
1
t tt
VOLATILITY . 
 
It should be noted that the POLVOL measure reflects both demand and supply side changes. 
The former refer, as discussed, to non-committed voters changing parties, while the latter are 
related to party mergers, break ups or other changes in their composition or their name. This 
occurs relatively frequently in Flanders, especially within and amongst local parties (Vermeir 
and Heyndels, 2006). While demand-side volatility is expected to put competitive pressure on 
politicians, the incentives from supply-side induced volatility are less clear – and one can argue 
that some of these changes do not imply ‘true’ political volatility (e.g., name changes). Lacking 
detailed information on these supply-side changes, we adopt an empirical approach to reduce 
their impact on POLVOL.4 Particularly, we purge elections in municipalities where at least one 
party shows a gain or loss that can be deemed ‘too strong’ to reflect the political reality within 
the municipality. We thereby define ‘too strong’ as changes in excess of 10% of seats since such 
drastic shifts are more likely due to a party, say, changing its name than to voters’ changing 
their commitments and votes. This implies that our (corrected) measure of intertemporal 
competition in municipality i (POLVOL-10) equals the average political volatility excluding 
those elections where at least one party surpassed the 10-percent change. 
 
                                                 
3  While this rest category is clearly not optimal, our data do not allow us to track the electoral rise and 
fall of each separate local party. Note also that two versions of this variable were considered, using 
either seat or vote shares. The tenor of the results is not affected by this choice and we use seats 
throughout the analysis presented. 
4  Ideally, such supply-side elements are dealt with by checking for each case what happened using, for 
example, newspaper articles. Given the absence of such information for many of the (especially 
smaller) Flemish municipalities, this is unfortunately unfeasible. Hence, we opted for the empirical 
approach discussed in the main text.  
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Table A1 in appendix shows that the average value for our POLVOL measure equals 20.93%, 
indicating that political parties are confronted with a (net) change of one out of five voters in 
every election. Still, correcting for supply-side volatility in POLVOL-10 strongly reduces 
observed volatility to 7.38%. It should be observed that the corrected measure of volatility 
(POLVOL-10) can at times not be calculated in a municipality as there was at least one party 
which vote share changed by 10% or more in every election over the period. This is the case for 
72 of the 308 municipalities and in the empirical analysis, we pick this up by giving these 
municipalities the maximum observed volatility and adding a dummy variable (DVOL10+) 
equal to 1 if the municipality was in that situation (i.e., ‘imputed’ maximum volatility) and 0 in 
all other cases.5 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Dependent variable: Government productive efficiency 
Productively efficient governments can be defined as those that need fewer resources to 
generate a high level of public goods while productively inefficient governments use a high 
level of resources to generate moderate or low levels of public goods (Koopmans, 1951). Given 
this definition, a measure of government efficiency can be devised by relating a jurisdiction’s 
total expenditures (i.e., the inputs used) to its provision of public goods (i.e., the outputs 
produced). We relate inputs and outputs via the non-parametric approach of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (assuming constant returns to scale) developed by Farrell (1957). In this 
approach, a ‘best practice’ frontier is generated as a linear envelopment of the data and any 
deviation from the best practice frontier is interpreted as productive inefficiency. Technically, 
                                                 
5  We also experimented with less restrictive cut-offs at changes in excess of 15% and 20% of the seats. 
For POLVOL-15 and POLVOL-20, the average value of the volatility index equals 10.34% and 12.24%, 
respectively. There are 24 and 10 cases, respectively, where the measure cannot be calculated using 
these cut-offs. Estimation results using these alternative variables lie between those for unregulated 
partisan shifts (POLVOL) and the most “severe” restriction at 10% (POLVOL-10) (details on request). 
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the best practice frontier is constructed by solving a linear programming problem of the 
following form (Lovell, 1993):  
 k
}z,...,z,{ n1k
Min 

 (1) 
 Subject to: 0CzC
n
1j
jjkk  

 
  kr
n
1j
jrj yyz 

 with r = 1, …, s 
  0z, jk    for j = 1, …, n 
     
Where Ck and Cj represent total inputs employed by organisation k and j respectively, ykr and 
yjr denote the output level for organisations k and j with respect to output r, s equals the 
number of outputs taken into account and n is the number of organisations under study. 
Finally, zj are weights given to the organisations with which organisation k is compared in the 
determination of its productive (in)efficiency. In equilibrium, the value of the objective 
function, k , represents how efficient organisation k employs its inputs (Ck) in the production 
of its outputs (r = 1, …, s).  
 
Note that equation (1) assumes that jurisdictions can linearly scale input and outputs (see 
‘DEA-crs’ representation in figure 1), which may be overly restrictive. We can, however, allow 
for variable returns to scale in the above linear programming problem by adding one 
additional constraint (i.e. 0z
n
1j j
  ) to equation (1).  While this generates a piecewise linear 
best practice frontier (see ‘DEA-vrs’ representation in figure 1), it still imposes strict convexity 
of this frontier. Adding one further restriction (zj  {0, 1}) also relaxes this and creates a frontier 
with a staircase shape in the input-output space (see ‘FDH’ representation in figure 1). 
Although we calculated all three measures of productive efficiency, their results were all highly 
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correlated and the final choice for the estimations below was determined by the measure that 
gave the best fit (i.e. DEA-CRS).6 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Our input variable equals total expenditures in the municipality in the fiscal year 2000. Our 
output variables relate to the level of local public goods provision in sectors where local 
governments in Flanders assume the prime responsibility (e.g., education, social, 
administrative and recreational services). Following previous work on local government 
productive efficiency (for an extensive review, see Kalb, 2010), we thereby use the following 
proxies for public outputs: (a) the number of subsistence grants beneficiaries, (b) the number of 
students in local primary schools, (c) the share of inhabitants older than 65, (d) garbage 
clearance, (e) the surface of public recreational facilities (in hectare), and (f) the length of the 
municipal road infrastructure. In all cases, productive efficiency is increased whenever more 
services can be rendered (e.g., more roads maintained, more students taught, more garbage 
collected, and so forth) for a given amount of inputs. Though following accepted practice in the 
literature (Kalb, 2010), these output indicators are obviously not ideal. For example, the 
number of subsistence grants beneficiaries is a rather crude proxy for the services rendered to 
low-income families. Unfortunately, better measures are not available, nor is information on 
the quality of outputs. This, regrettably, reflects the general problem with defining and 
measuring public sector inputs and outputs (see Levitt and Joyce, 1987; De Borger and 
Kerstens, 1996). Admittedly, such problems are less severe when concentrating on productive 
                                                 
6  Given the existence of measurement error and other stochastic influences, it may not be appropriate to 
designate all deviations from the frontier as inefficiency (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den 
Broeck, 1977). Yet, addressing this through the calculation of productive efficiency using stochastic 
frontier approaches does not affect our inferences below. Note also that building the best practice 
frontier based on the decision-making units at hand (the only possibility in real-world applications) 
implies that the ensuing efficiency measures are by definition relative rather than absolute measures. 
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efficiency in given areas of public good provision, such as waste collection, tax administration 
or road maintenance (Kalseth and Rattsø, 1995; De Borger and Kerstens, 2000). However, such 
a more restricted analysis is not warranted for our purpose since political competition is likely 
to affect the management of the public sector as a whole. A focus on one particular aspect of 
service provision may thus be inadequate (or, indeed, misleading).7 
 
For the productive efficiency measure deriving from this analysis, it holds that higher values 
point to more efficient municipalities with a limit at unity for municipalities on the efficiency 
hull. As shown by Figure 1, there is considerable variation in the level of productive 
(in)efficiency across the Flemish municipalities. The mean productive efficiency level being 
58.72%, ranging from just over 26% efficient to fully efficient (see also Table A1 in the 
appendix). 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
3.2 Empirical model 
Most basically, our empirical model assessing whether competition affects politicians’ rent-
seeking behaviour can be written as:  
 
EFFICIENCYj = b0 + b1 COMPETITIONj + b2 CONTROLj + uj  (2) 
 
Where EFFICIENCY is the measure of government performance calculated as the value of the 
objective function, k , in equation (1) in section 3.1. COMPETITION is a vector of two variables 
reflecting different aspects of the extent of competition in the political arena within the 
                                                 
7  Though panel data might resolve some of these measurement issues, time series data were not 
available for various output variables. 
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municipality (as defined in section 2.2). We thereby rely on data from all 308 Flemish 
municipalities in 2000. While subscript j indicates the jth municipality and uj represents the 
error term (assumed to be i.i.d.), CONTROL is a vector of control variables capturing potential 
influences from respectively the demand side, the budgetary situation and the political context. 
 
Demand-side variables include per capita income (INCOME; in 1000€), income equality 
(INEQ), population size (POPULATION) and population density (DENS; as inhabitants per 
km²). The wealth of residents as measured by their average income may be important when the 
use of up-to-date techniques (which enable productive efficiency) is limited by the wealth of 
the community and its inhabitants. Furthermore, the rich may be more effective in (and have 
bigger incentives for) demanding greater productive efficiency (Knack, 2002). On the other 
hand, a wealthy population might simplify raising revenue, limiting the requirements to be 
efficient. Income inequality (INEQ), measured by the ratio of the interquartile difference in 
income to the median value, is a proxy for heterogeneity in the population. Such heterogeneity 
may imply a more complex set of needs and/or demands for public good provision (Jottier et 
al., 2012), making efficient policy less evident. Finally, population size examines scale 
economies, while population density may serve as a proxy for a number of social problems that 
are associated with urban centres and which may make achieving productive efficiency more 
difficult. On the other hand, and more from a supply-side point of view, services (such as, say, 
care for the elderly) may be harder to provide if the population is less heavily concentrated. 
 
The budgetary context of the municipality may affect productive efficiency ratings and is 
measured through four variables. Firstly, we include total municipal tax revenues (TAXREV, 
per capita; in €) and unconditional grants (GRANT, per capita; in €) as local governments’ 
accountability to the public (for taxes) and the Regional governments (who provide the grants) 
may differ. Hence, the share of these respective revenue sources (which are the two main 
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revenue sources) may differentially affect productive efficiency. Secondly, high indebtedness 
carried over from the past may limit a municipalities’ ability to be efficient in a given year (as 
interests and amortization payments reduce the funds available to provide public goods in the 
current period). Yet, a municipality may also get the benefits of historical (debt-financed) 
investments without needing to resort to additional spending in the current time period and so 
presently is (apparently) more efficient.8 For this reason, we control for past budgetary 
behaviour by including total local long-term public debt (DEBT, per capita; in €). Both 
arguments can be reversed for (current account) surpluses (SURPLUS; per capita; in €). Still, as 
debt and surplus may have asymmetric effects on productive efficiency, both variables must be 
examined separately.  
 
Finally, we include four political control variables. Firstly, given that left-wing governments 
are generally assumed to favour larger public sector provision, the question arises whether this 
increase in size is efficient. Hence, we include the (weighted) average ideology of the 
incumbent party or parties (IDEO), which measures the ideology along a left (0) to right (10) 
scale. Secondly, government fragmentation has a negative impact on decision-making powers 
(e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Ashworth et al., 2005; Goeminne et al., 2008; Le Maux et al., 
2011). To capture its potential effect on productive efficiency, we introduce two variables: a 
dummy variable (SOLE) indicating whether or not there is a single party government and a 
variable capturing the number of coalition parties (NUMCOAL). While single party 
governments do not suffer (as much) from a gridlock of decision-making (and thus have more 
‘opportunity’ to be efficient), they may not have the incentive to be efficient as their monopoly 
power allows for higher rent extraction. However, the more parties in the government, the 
stronger gridlock effects, leading to lower productive efficiency. Finally, government efficiency 
                                                 
8
  Flemish municipalities are in principle only allowed to generate debt for financing long-term capital 
investment projects (e.g., on infrastructure). Note that using debt relative to income (rather than per 
capita) provides qualitatively similar results to the ones presented. 
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may depend on the strength of the opposition. To capture this, we include the number of 
opposition parties and the size of the majority of the ruling party (or coalition) measured 
through the number of seats that it has (they have) relative to the combined opposition 
(EXCESS). We expect more comfortable majorities (and thus a weaker, smaller opposition) to 
have fewer incentives to be efficient. 
  
3.3 Empirical results 
Before presenting the results, a number of methodological issues should be mentioned. Firstly, 
the dependent variable is constrained to a maximum of unity. While this may not be severe as 
only a very small proportion of the municipalities are on the production frontier (i.e., 8 out of 
308), the obvious way to deal with this is through a Truncation analysis.9 Secondly, some 
independent variables might not be exogenous. For example, inefficient governments may lead 
to greater competition (e.g., more parties competing), higher indebtedness or lower budget 
surpluses. Moreover, if the rich demand higher productive efficiency, this may lead to a 
Tiebout-type sorting effect whereby rich people move into efficient areas. To accommodate for 
these possible endogeneity issues, we complement the Truncation results with results based on 
instrumental variables estimation (IVE). Since no instruments are readily available for all our 
independent variables, artificial variables were constructed based on orthogonality using 
higher moments (Dagenais and Dagenais, 1997).10 These are by construction highly correlated 
with the independent variables, but uncorrelated with the dependent variable – making them 
intrinsically useful instruments (though arguably harder to interpret precisely). Finally, and 
crucially, there is the inherent difficulty – as outlined by Simar and Wilson (2007) – that a two-
                                                 
9  This follows Simar and Wilson (2007), who discuss why this is more appropriate than the oft-used 
Tobit analysis. 
10  The instruments used are a constant, z1 and z4 where (with * designating the Hadamard element by 
element matrix multiplication operator and the variables in deviation from mean form)  
    z1 = x*x;   z4 = x*x*x – 3x[E(x’x/N)*Ik]. 
with x reflecting the right hand side variables in the equation, see Dagenais and Dagenais (1997, 197-
198). The choice was dictated by the Monte Carlo simulations of Dagenais and Dagenais (1997).  
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stage estimation procedure (with DEA estimation to produce the dependent variable for the 
second stage (in)efficiency regressions) suffers from “complicated, unknown serial correlation”, 
which may lead to biased inferences.11 To deal with this issue, we rely on their preferred 
algorithm #2 to re-examine, via boot-strapping techniques, the robustness of our estimates. 
This algorithm not only estimates appropriate confidence intervals, but also produces 
“parametric bias-corrected estimates” of the productive efficiency measure to deal with the 
additional complication that the initial efficiency estimates are biased when significant 
determinants of efficiency are retrieved in the second stage (see Simar and Wilson, 2007, for 
details).12 
 
Turning to the estimation results, we present a number of different results in table 1, which 
vary in the estimation method employed to accommodate the various methodological issues 
raised above. Comparing the results from several relevant estimation techniques, we can give a 
more complete picture of the effects uncovered, while at the same time testing the robustness of 
our findings to the distributional assumptions made under the different approaches. 
Specifically, columns (2) through (4) in table 1 present a set of Truncated estimation results – 
which account for the bounded nature of our dependent variable – using the least restrictive 
measure of political volatility (POLVOL). Column (2) thereby presents the complete model, 
column (3) the confidence intervals from the boot-strapping correction, and column (4) 
removes insignificant variables. In column (5), we turn to an IV estimator to control for the 
possible endogeneity of some of our explanatory variables. For reasons of comparison, column 
                                                 
11 The key issue is that in many cases re-estimation using boot-strapping techniques might lead to results 
where the original estimates are not even within the confidence intervals of the corrected estimation; 
This is not the case in our analysis (see below). 
12  Once this bias adjustment is taken into account, eight further municipalities become “efficient”. Note 
also that, in the Appendix, table A2 shows results using Simar and Wilson’s (2007) algorithm #1, 
which involves only a bootstrap estimation of the second stage of the estimation. It can be seen by a 
comparison of table 1 and table A2 that the overall implications of the model are broadly unchanged, 
though correcting for the bias in the efficiency estimates further strengthens our central results. 
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(6) also presents results using OLS. In both cases, only the final model excluding insignificant 
variables is presented to preserve space. Finally, columns (7) through (9) repeat the preferred 
Truncated regression from columns (2) through (4) using the most restrictive ‘outlier-corrected’ 
version of the political volatility measure (i.e., POLVOL-10). Generally, as can be seen from the 
diagnostic tests, all equations are well specified.13 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The first factor to note from table 1 is the general robustness and consistency of the results. 
Hence, it can be inferred that both the truncation problem – generated by the upper bound on 
our dependent variable – and the potential endogeneity of some explanatory variables have 
only limited effects on our findings. Secondly, all the estimated coefficients nicely fall within 
the boot-strapped confidence intervals in all cases, such that our results appear consistent both 
in terms of sign and significance. Turning first to the control variables, a number of 
observations can be made.  Firstly, while population density does not affect local governments’ 
productive efficiency, the significant negative sign on population suggests the presence of 
important diseconomies of scale. Secondly, debt and surplus affect productive efficiency in 
opposite ways, with debt adversely affecting efficiency and surplus increasing it – in line with 
expectations. Thirdly, the total tax burden is negatively related to productive efficiency, which 
suggests that larger governments are less efficient (for a similar finding on Norwegian 
municipalities, see Borge et al., 2008). Fourthly, income per capita is associated with lower 
levels of productive efficiency. This could imply that the rich are not better at demanding 
higher value for the taxes they pay or, possibly, bother less about it. Greater inequality also 
                                                 
13  Examination was made of different functional forms, notably logarithms. We only present results 
from the linear specification as these proved superior in terms of goodness-of-fit. Note also that 
when the government fragmentation variables are removed, competition’s significance is increased 
(though the size of the effect remains roughly the same).  
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links to less productive efficiency, possibly reflecting competing requirements in such 
municipalities (Jottier et al., 2012). Fifthly, while right-wing governments appear to be more 
efficient than left-wing governments, government fragmentation is associated with lower 
efficiency (in line with, for instance, Ashworth et al., 2005; Le Maux et al., 2011). Indeed, while 
governments with a larger majority (in terms of excess seats in the council) are linked to 
enhanced productive efficiency, taking into account the substantively much stronger negative 
effect of coalitions (NUMCOAL) implies that a 16-seat majority is needed to outweigh the 
negative effect on efficiency of a two-party coalition. In addition, a more fragmented 
opposition is associated with lower government efficiency, implying that a strong unified 
opposition forces the government to be productively efficient. Finally, at odds with 
expectations, grants appear to be positively related to municipal efficiency. This may imply 
that grants in Flanders are targeted correctly and improve incentives for the municipality, or 
that the Flemish (regional and provincial) government exercises a relatively strict control over 
local finances, such that inefficient spending (of, for example, grants) is less feasible. Future 
research should explore this issue further. 
 
Regarding our central research question – i.e., does political competition improve productive 
efficiency? – it appears that increased electoral competition in terms of the number of parties 
contesting the election is related to greater efficiency. Similarly, intertemporal competition 
reflected in a politically more mobile electorate likewise engenders increased efficiency: i.e., 
whilst having relatively small coefficients, the volatility measures are statistically significant at 
conventional levels both under an unconstrained definition (using POLVOL in columns (2) to 
(6)) and when extreme volatility is factored out (using POLVOL-10 and DVOL10+ in columns 
(7) to (9)).14 Note that while the former effect could potentially be affected by the reverse 
                                                 
14  When regressions are run using only those municipalities where POLVOL can be measured, there is a 
minimal change in the size of coefficients though no change of inference. 
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causation issue referred to above (i.e., lower productive efficiency generating more parties 
competing in the next election), this cannot be an explanation for the effect of political volatility 
since this is measured using historical data from the 1976-2000 period (see above). 
 
One final note is in order: given the positive effect of political competition and the negative 
effect of government fragmentation, one might ask whether the competition effect outweighs 
the potential costs of increased government fragmentation. In all cases, the competition effects 
are stronger both in terms of their substantive size and in terms of statistical significance than 
the government fragmentation effects. Indeed, calculated at the averages, the competition effect 
of 0.206 is close to twice the weak-government counter-effect of 0.104. Given that the 
dependent variable lies between 0 and 1, this is a potentially sizeable effect.15 As a consequence, 
it can be concluded that competition leads to improved government productive efficiency. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Competition leads to lower rent extraction in the private sector. That is, monopolies set their 
prices higher and their quantities lower than what would be the case under perfect competition 
– and pocket a profit (or monopoly rent) in the process. Political competition has been 
identified as a mechanism that disciplines the political leadership in much the same way. 
Politicians that do not face a credible threat of removal from office (i.e., lack political 
competitors) might feel more prone to serve narrow economic or selfish interests. They are held 
less accountable in the sense that they can do this without putting their re-election at risk.  
 
                                                 
15  In this consideration, we ignore the positive effect of ‘excess seats’. One might, however, argue that 
larger majorities can be interpreted at least in part as reduced political competition (Holbrook and 
Van Dunk, 1993; Vanhanen, 2000; Ferris et al., 2008). Taking such effect into account, there would still 
be a beneficial effect for competition. 
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Testing this proposition on a dataset of 308 Flemish municipalities, we find considerable 
support. Electoral competition – measured in terms of the number of parties that participate in 
the election – has a significant positive effect on the productive efficiency of municipal policy. 
A second indicator of political competition – i.e., the volatility of election outcomes over time – 
suggests a similar positive, albeit substantively weaker, effect of competition on productive 
efficiency. ‘Intertemporal’ competition thus appears a weaker driving force of government 
efficiency compared to competition for office at a given election. While it should be noted that 
competition may lead to fragmented governments (which works against productive efficiency), 
the beneficial effects are found to outweigh the negative ones in our setting. Hence, we 
conclude that competition in the political arena appears to be force for productive efficiency. 
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FIGURE 2: 
GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY IN 308 FLEMISH MUNICIPALITIES (2010) 
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TABLE 1 
POLITICAL COMPETITION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY (BIAS-ADJUSTED EFFICIENCY MEASURES) 
 
Dependent Variable Bias-Adjusted 
Dependent 
Variable 
Boot-Strapped 
Confidence 
Intervals 
Bias-Adjusted 
Dependent 
Variable 
Bias-Adjusted 
Dependent 
Variable 
Bias-Adjusted 
Dependent 
Variable 
Bias-Adjusted 
Dependent 
Variable 
Boot-Strapped 
Confidence 
Intervals 
Bias-Adjusted 
Dependent 
Variable 
Estimation TRUNCATED TRUNCATED TRUNCATED IVE OLS TRUNCATED TRUNCATED TRUNCATED 
Independent Variables         
Intercept 
 
0.805*** 
(0.092) 
0.620, 0.959 0.801*** 
(0.091) 
0.842*** 
(0.103) 
0.867*** 
(0.088) 
0.815*** 
(0.102) 
0.629, 0.948 0.812*** 
(0.089) 
ELPAR 0.035*** 
(0.011) 
0.015, 0.047 0.035*** 
(0.011) 
0.038*** 
(0.013) 
0.041*** 
(0.011) 
0.033*** 
(0.011) 
0.012, 0.044 0.033*** 
(0.011) 
POLVOL 0.0012** 
(0.0006) 
0.0009, 0.0016 0.0012** 
(0.0005) 
0.0012* 
(0.0007) 
0.001** 
(0.0005) 
   
POLVOL-10%      0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.001, 0.004 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
DVOL10+      -0.003 
(0.043) 
-0.014, 0.012  
SOLE -0.014 
(0.014) 
-0.006, 0.008    -0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.003, 0.010  
NUMCOAL -0.025* 
(0.015) 
-0.045, 0.001 -0.026** 
(0.012) 
-0.028** 
(0.015) 
-0.027** 
(0.014) 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
-0.043, 0.004 -0.026* 
(0.015) 
EXCESS 0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.001, 0.007 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.000, 0.007 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
NUMOPP -0.023* 
(0.014) 
-0.046, -0.009 -0.025** 
(0.013) 
-0.026** 
(0.014) 
-0.025** 
(0.013) 
-0.029** 
(0.013) 
-0.050, -0.011 -0.029** 
(0.014) 
IDEO 0.058*** 
(0.015) 
0.032, 0.084 0.060*** 
(0.015) 
0.054*** 
(0.019) 
0.051*** 
(0.015) 
0.057*** 
(0.016) 
0.032, 0.082 0.058*** 
(0.016) 
INCOME (x1000) -0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.017, -0.004 -0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.005) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.017, -0.004 -0.011*** 
(0.004) 
INEQ -0.002** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002, -0.001 -0.002** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002* 
(0.0008) 
-0.002** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002, -0.001 -0.002** 
(0.0006) 
POPULATION 
(/103) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005, -0.002 -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005, -0.002 -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
SURPLUS  
(/108) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.004, 0.035 0.015* 
(0.009) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.002, 0.031 0.015* 
(0.008) 
DEBT 
(/108) 
-1.195** 
(0.610) 
-0.257, -2.101 -1.175** 
(0.595) 
-1.182** 
(0.601) 
-1.144** 
(0.587) 
-1.354** 
(0.602) 
-0.326, -2.261 -1.340** 
(0.602) 
TAXREV 
(/103) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.021, -0.014 -0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.021, -0.013 -0.017*** 
(0.003) 
DENS 
(/103) 
0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.007, 0.045    0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.008, 0.043  
GRANTS 
(/108) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.006, 0.023 0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.005, 0.022 0.011** 
(0.005) 
Sigma 0.087*** 
(0.004) 
0.081, 0.093 0.091*** 
(0.004) 
  0.090*** 
(0.004) 
0.086, 0.094 0.090*** 
(0.004) 
Pseudo R² 0.474  0.443 0.412 0.422 0.492  0.486 
Log-Likelihood 302.056  301.537 293.662 297.148 306.015  305.774 
Diagnostic Tests         
NORMALITY 2.771  2.112 2.836 3.349 3.110  3.523 
RESET2 1.428  1.572 1.364 0.997 0.772  0.836 
RESET3 0.885  1.003 1.553 1.283 1.239  1.250 
White Heteroscedasticity 10.221  8.997 11.137 14.223 15.223  12.976 
Sargan    3.492     
Hausman (IV Exogeneity)    1.058     
INSIG   1.038 (2) 0.927 (2) 0.842 (2)   0.048 (3) 
Notes: N=308; All estimations reflect truncated regressions except where indicated. Estimated standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * 
at 10%. The Sargan test of mis-specification of the instruments indicates that the choice is satisfactory. Similarly, the Hausman test indicating exogeneity 
implies a satisfactory estimating equation. INSIG is the test of omitting the variables from the most general versions of the model (columns 2 and 7) and 
indicates omission of jointly insignificant variables; Pseudo R² is a measure as suggested by Veall and Zimmermann (1996), following Dhrymes (1986). 
Diagnostic tests are computed following Pagan and Vella (1989) and follow a t-distribution. The only exceptions are those for White unknown-form 
heteroscedasticity and normality, which are computed following Chesher and Irish (1987) and follow a ² distribution.  
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 APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (N=308; year 2000) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
     
Efficiency 58.72 14.08 26.09 100 
ELPAR 5.16 1.74 2 13 
POLVOL 20.93 10.51 0 65.48 
POLVOL-10% 7.37 4.18 0 18.67 
POLVOL-15% 10.34 5.05 0 24.07 
POLVOL-20% 12.24 5.47 0 26.67 
SOLE 0.39 0.48 0 1 
NUMCOAL 1.75 0.74 1 5 
EXCESS 10.17 9.35 0 47.83 
NUMOPP 2.62 1.18 0 6 
IDEO 5.01 0.58 2.7 6.1 
INCOME (in 1000€) 11.13 1.47 7.40 15.77 
INEQ 95.89 10.35 69.50 132.50 
DENS (pop/km²) 511.22 443.08 51.06 3135.75 
SURPLUS (per cap; in €) 7.15 8.78 -15.08 34.43 
DEBT (per cap; in €) 1045.01 465.72 0 3404.22 
TAXREV (per cap; in €) 426.38 187.64 65.74 2583.86 
GRANTS (per cap; in €) 104.37 59.50 45.51 749.28 
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TABLE A2 
POLITICAL COMPETITION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY (INITIAL EFFICIENCY MEASURES) 
 
Dependent Variable Initial DEA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Boot-Strapped 
Confidence 
Intervals 
Initial DEA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Initial DEA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Initial DEA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Initial DEA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Boot-Strapped 
Confidence 
Intervals 
Initial DEA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Estimation TRUNCATED TRUNCATED TRUNCATED IVE OLS    
Independent Variables         
Intercept 
 
0.669 *** 
(0.107) 
0.504, 0.892 0.670 *** 
(0.105) 
0.754 *** 
(0.124) 
0.782 *** 
(0.116) 
0.668 *** 
(0.107) 
0.504, 0.887 0.670 *** 
(0.103) 
ELPAR 0.029** 
(0.012) 
0.008, 0.053 0.029** 
(0.012) 
0.034** 
(0.016) 
0.037** 
(0.014) 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
0.005, 0.052 0.027** 
(0.012) 
POLVOL 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.001, 0.004 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
   
POLVOL-10%      0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.001, 0.005 0.004** 
(0.002) 
DVOL10+      -0.013 
(0.032) 
-0.024, 0.012  
SOLE -0.008 
(0.016) 
-0.037, 0.015    -0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.034, 0.019  
NUMCOAL -0.022 
(0.019) 
-0.023, -0.000 -0.022 
(0.018) 
-0.032* 
(0.021) 
-0.033* 
(0.020) 
-0.022 
(0.018) 
-0.027, -0.001 -0.023 
(0.018) 
EXCESS 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.000, 0.006 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.000, 0.006 0.002** 
(0.001) 
NUMOPP -0.022* 
(0.015) 
-0.050, -0.003 -0.022* 
(0.015) 
-0.032* 
(0.017) 
-0.034* 
(0.017) 
-0.027* 
(0.015) 
-0.054, -0.004 -0.028* 
(0.015) 
IDEO 0.045** 
(0.018) 
0.017, 0.081 0.047** 
(0.018) 
0.043** 
(0.021) 
0.041** 
(0.020) 
0.043** 
(0.018) 
0.016, 0.078 0.045** 
(0.018) 
INCOME (x1000) -0.009** 
(0.005) 
-0.018, -0.004 -0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.017, -0.004 -0.008** 
(0.004) 
INEQ -0.0012* 
(0.0006) 
-0.003, -0.000 -0.0012* 
(0.0007) 
-0.0015** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0015** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0012* 
(0.0007) 
-0.003, -0.000 -0.0012* 
(0.0007) 
POPULATION 
(/103) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005, -0.001 -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005, -0.001 -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
SURPLUS  
(/108) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.001, 0.037 0.014 
(0.010) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.000, 0.034 0.012 
(0.010) 
DEBT 
(/108) 
-0.786 
(0.699) 
-0.172, -1.946 -0.763 
(0.699) 
-1.216 
(0.724) 
-1.314* 
(0.776) 
-0.939 
(0.694) 
-0.201, -2.130 -0.924 
(0.694) 
TAXREV 
(/103) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020, -0.009 -0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019, -0.009 -0.014*** 
(0.003) 
DENS 
(/103) 
0.009 
(0.017) 
-0.002, 0.038    0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.003, 0.030  
GRANTS 
(/108) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.004, 0.022 0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.002, 0.021 0.010** 
(0.004) 
Sigma 0.110*** 
(0.004) 
0.098, 0.113 0.110*** 
(0.004) 
  0.109*** 
(0.004) 
0.098, 0.112 0.109*** 
(0.004) 
Pseudo R² 0.274  0.268 0.229 0.247 0.301  0.299 
Log-Likelihood 237.161  236.913 211.161 211.161 240.163  240.0239 
Diagnostic Tests         
NORMALITY 2.662  3.116 3.482 3.882 2.901  2.957 
RESET2 1.886  1.900 1.752 1.520 1.311  1.273 
RESET3 1.790  1.762 1.589 1.326 1.402  1.198 
White Heteroscedasticity 15.901  16.336 17.448 14.930 12.342  15.206 
Sargan    2.429     
Hausman (IV Exogeneity)    1.362     
INSIG (2) to (4)   0.496 (2) 0.483 (2) 0.572 (2)   0.278 (3) 
Notes: N=308; All estimations reflect truncated regressions except where indicated. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses; *** significant at 1%, ** at 
5% and * at 10%. The Sargan test of mis-specification of the instruments indicates that the choice is satisfactory. Similarly, the Hausman test 
indicating exogeneity implies a satisfactory estimating equation. INSIG is the test of omitting the variables from the most general versions of the 
model (columns 2 and 7) and indicates an omission of jointly insignificant variables; Pseudo R² is a measure as suggested by Veall and 
Zimmermann (1996), following Dhrymes (1986). Diagnostic tests are computed following Pagan and Vella (1989) and follow a t-distribution. The 
only exceptions are those for White unknown-form heteroscedasticity test and normality which are computed following Chesher and Irish (1987) 
and follow a ² distribution. 
 
